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A REPORT FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF LATIN AMERICA'S
LONGEST ARMED CONFLICT
Kenneth B. Haesly, IIAFIER fifty-two years of conflict and almost four years of inter-
mittent negotiation, Latin America's longest civil war, between
the government of Colombia and the country's largest rebel
group, is over.' The conflict took the lives of hundreds of thousands of
Colombians and displaced millions more. 2 It hampered the economy of a
country rich in natural resources and human capital.3 The Colombian
finance minister predicts costs associated with reconstruction may run
upwards of thirty billion U.S. dollars.4 Economists put the price tag at
anywhere from sixty to ninety billion U.S. dollars.5 Though Colombia's
president, Juan Manuel Santos, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) leaders reached a formal agreement in August 2016,
the compromise also faced a major hurdle: after a national referendum to
approve the deal was narrowly defeated in October of 2016, a second
referendum was eschewed, and a revised peace deal was brought before
Colombia's congress, where it received unanimous approval in both the
house and senate. 6 As an added bonus, President Santos received the
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Nobel Peace Prize.7
While peace anywhere should be celebrated, there has been much criti-
cism of the recently completed peace pact in Colombia for several rea-
sons. A particular sticking point are amnesty provisions and concessions
given to members of the FARC rebel group that a majority of voting
Colombians, multiple human rights groups, and other international ob-
servers have not quite been able to stomach. While Colombians have a
right to be upset, the reality is transitional justice following major con-
flicts is complex. There is a fine balance between making cost-effective
and fiscally responsible decisions and seeking justice for those who have
suffered during periods of violence and oppression. Unfortunately,
Colombians are now facing the reality that there is no easy path to justice
after winding down one of the longest armed conflicts in the Western
Hemisphere.
Take, for example, the process of investigating and prosecuting those
responsible for atrocities on both sides of the conflict - Colombia could
choose to keep this process domestic, or defer to international organiza-
tions, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the United Na-
tions (UN) to undertake investigations and pursue convictions to hold the
proper parties accountable. Though keeping prosecutions domestic may
lead to perceived leniency for serious human rights violations, they pro-
vide more autonomy for Colombians to make ultimate decisions regard-
ing internal issues. But the drawback to this internal approach are basic
costs associated with domestic prosecution; though once a rising star in
the Latin American economy, Colombia is not sitting nearly as strong
fiscally as it has been in the past. Alternatively, turning over prosecution
to the ICC or to a special international tribunal under the guidance of the
UN would mean Colombians effectively cede control of domestic affairs
to international bodies. As of now Colombia has chosen the former
route, through what they term the "Special Jurisdiction for Peace" (SJP).
This report seeks to investigate Colombia's current economic situation
and the costs of transitional justice following the conflict.
I. ECONOMIC SNAPSHOT
Billed as Latin America's oldest democracy, Colombia has long
benefitted from sound macroeconomic policy and openness to global
trade and finance, coupled by strong reforms on regulatory improvement
and bolstering the private sector.8 In 2014, Colombia overtook Peru to
become Latin America's fastest growing economy.9 But, Colombia's
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gross domestic product (GDP) fell in 2015, after averaging a growth rate
of 4.8% per year from 2010-2014.10
The Colombian economy is largely based on commodities. As Latin
America's fourth largest oil producer and the world's fourth largest coal
exporter, Colombia is especially susceptible to diminishments in global
commodities markets." But due to sound economic policies and aggres-
sive promotion of free trade agreements, Colombia has recently been
able to weather significant global slowdowns, such as the oil crash of
2015.12
Despite a strong economic outlook, Colombia continues to face chal-
lenges. Drug trafficking and security remain major issues, and while a
peace deal has been reached, the impact of a five decade narco-funded
guerilla insurgency is not easily erased. Nearly forty-percent of Colom-
bia's coca is contained in eleven FARC dominated municipalities.13
While the Colombian government is focused on trying to create alterna-
tives to farming coca (the raw material for cocaine), significant capital
will be needed to create the necessary infrastructure, such as roads and
technical support, to make the endeavor viable.14
The achievements of President Santos and his contemporaries, as well
as all those involved with the peace negotiations are laudable, but do
come with a cost. Elements of peacekeeping such as disarmament, demo-
bilization, and reintegration must now be funded.1 5 After disarming
under the UN's watch (within thirty days of implementation of the agree-
ment), FARC rebels will receive a government subsidy equal to ninety-
percent of Colombia's minimum wage for two years,1 6 as well up-front
costs of helping hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of displaced peo-
ple return and resettle homes will require immense funding.' 7 Economic
studies place the per-year costs for integration of rebel combatants into
society at $2 billion.' 8 Subsidies for programs related to victims could
cost as much as $3.5 billion.19
10. 'The World Factbook, Colombia Profile', CIA.Gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html (last visited March 8, 2017).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Nevertheless, President Santos and his government have conveyed that
peace will yield both social and economic dividends by offsetting short-
term losses in the long run by reducing costs related to security and logis-
tical risks of business operations in the future.2 0 Macroeconomic studies
predict a more middling result, with peace between government and gue-
rilla forces providing a boost to the Colombian economy's medium-term
outlook.21
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Most at issue in the peace agreement, and a large reason why it was
defeated in the national referendum, are concessions given to FARC
rebels, including certain amnesty provisions that allow those who confess
to crimes to avoid prison sentences and instead be subject to "repatria-
tion." 2 2 Those in opposition to the peace deal, led by former President
Alvaro Uribe, expressed reservations that those who have committed
crimes will be given lenient sentences amounting to impunity for their
actions, and are "getting away with murder," and international groups
such as Human Rights Watch have suggested the SJP legal framework
constitutes a "surrender of justice." 23
In 2015, negotiators representing the government and rebels formu-
lated the idea of the SJPs in order to handle what negotiators termed
''grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law" committed by
FARC guerillas. 2 4 At the time, groups such as Human Rights Watch
questioned whether the standards used by these tribunals could sync with
Colombia's binding obligations under international law to ensure ac-
countability for crimes against humanity and war crimes.2 5 Following the
events of this year, legal human-rights questions still persist in the justice
component of the peace agreement. For example, under the deal, those
who confessed to their crimes may be sentenced to community service
and "restricted movement" to avoid prison, and military commanders can
escape "command responsibility" for crimes committed by their troops. 2 6
The Colombian SJP will seek justice for what is referred to most often
as "war crimes," but which are more concretely described under interna-
tional law as genocide, torture, forced displacement, and sexual vio-
20. Martin De Angelis, 'Financing peace: The Colombian economy after the FARC',
GLOBAL RISK INSIGHTS (Oct. 12, 2015), http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/fi-
nancing-peace-the-colombian-economy-after-the-farc/.
21. 'Colombia: Peace deal will improve medium-term outlook', CAPITAL ECONOMICS
(July 14, 2016), available at: https://www.capitaleconomics.com/publications/latin-
america-economics/latin-america-watch/colombia-peace-deal-will-improve-me-
dium-term-outlook/.
22. 'Colombia peace deal: What are the most contentious points?', BBC (Sept. 28,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37457860.
23. Id.
24. Supra note 13.
25. Id.
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lence. 2 7 The form of justice, or rather, the form of punishment for these
crimes is what is most at issue with the Colombian public. 2 8 Those who
take responsibility and give full disclosure for crimes that have been com-
mitted will face a "restriction of liberties" for five to eight years.29 It is
unclear at this time what that restriction will entail, but it is implicit in the
agreement that it will not be prison. But those who do not cooperate, or
do not offer full disclosure, will be subject to prison time between five to
twenty years. 30 The same penalties will apply for actions that took place
in the conflict extend to members of the armed forces, and not just the
rebels, e.g., "false positive" killings of civilians who were disguised post-
mortem to look like combatants routinely took place in the early 2000s in
order to boost body counts to make it seem as if the Colombian army was
making progress in the war against the rebels.31 There are several bene-
fits of the SJP transitional justice system under the final peace agreement:
Colombian judges (as opposed to foreign jurists) will exclusively hear
cases; the tribunal will consider new cases during its first two years; the
tribunal will seek to conclude its work within ten years; and only the Co-
lombia Constitutional Court (the country's highest appellate court) will
have the authority to review tribunal decisions.32
Strong reactions opposing the perceived "impunity" for grave viola-
tions of humanitarian law are not misguided, especially for those who
lived through the conflict and witnessed the violence firsthand, e.g. for
example, leader of the "no" campaign and former Colombian president,
Alvaro Uribe, whose father was murdered by FARC rebels. But these
reactions conflate-or perhaps fail to see-the positives that can come from
non-custodial punishment and truth seeking initiatives. When winding
down a conflict of this complexity, concessions must be made. The Co-
lombian government, by seeking full confessions from an estimated 7,000
guerillas, 24,000 state officials, and 12,000 civilians, is seeking to move on
from the conflict by documenting and acknowledging that human rights
27. Grace Brown, 'Colombia's peace deals in depth: Transitional justice', COLOMBIA
REPORTS (Sep. 23, 2015), http://colombiareports.com/colombias-peace-deals-in-
depth-transitional-justice/.
28. 'Unlearning war', THE ECONOMIST (ONLINE) (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/americas/21705851 -chance-become-normal-country-unlearning-
war.
29. Id.; see also 'Acuerdo Final Para La Terminacion Del Conflict6 Y La Construcci6n
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violations occurred.3 3 Victims and survivors of conflict have a right to
know about violations that have occurred and those responsible. Such
memory initiatives can play a powerful role in contributing public under-
standing and facilitate healing as a country.34
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: COSTS AND ALTERNATIVES
Transitional justice bears significant costs. For example, Colombia may
not have the proper capacity and resources to pursue lengthy investiga-
tions and trials, much less provide just compensation for all of the victims
of such a drawn out conflict; elements of peacekeeping such as disarma-
ment, demobilization, and reintegration must be funded.35 Deep restruc-
turing of rural areas is predicted to come at a large monetary cost.3 6
Some experts suggest total costs could be large as $44 billion over a ten-
year period.3 7 Since that number reflects a significant percentage of Co-
lombia's entire GDP (fifteen-percent of Colombia's 2015 GDP), it is un-
likely that Colombia will even be able finance the peace endeavor
without the help of international financial institutions.38 Domestic aus-
terity measures and tax reforms are likely as well. And, while Colombian
officials may expect new investments to funnel into the country, this is by
no means guaranteed.3 9 Since commodity prices have slowed down
around the globe, so too has foreign direct investment in Colombia's
commodity rich economy.40
Alternatives to the SJP include turning over prosecution to the ICC or
to a special international tribunal under the guidance of the UN. The
ICC is a permanent international court that prosecutes perpetrators of
serious crimes against humanity.41 It was established by the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), and has been
adopted by 120 States, including Colombia.42 In fact, the situation in Co-
lombia has been under "preliminary examination" by the ICC since June
33. Adriaan Alsema, 'Colombia congress approves transitional war crimes court', Co-
LOMBIA REPORTS (March 14, 2017), http://colombiareports.com/colombia-con-
gress-approves-transitional-war-crimes-courts/.
34. 'Truth and Memory', ICTJ.ona, available at: https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transi-
tional-justice-issues/truth-and-memory (last visited March 15, 2017).
35. Vanda Felbab-Brown, 'Who pays for peace in Colombia?', BRoOKINGs (Sep. 29,
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/who-pays-for-peace-in-colombia/.
36. Id.
37. Alan Fleischmann & Ian Solomon, 'What It Really Costs for Colombia to Strike a
Peace Deal', FORTUNE (Oct. 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/06/colombia-farc-
peace-deal/.
38. 'Martin De Angelis, 'Financing Peace: The Colombian economy after the FARC',
GLOBAL RISK INSIGHTS (Oct. 12, 2015), http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/fi-
nancing-peace-the-colombian-economy-after-the-farc/.
39. Id.
40. Supra note 35.
41. 'Understanding the International Criminal Court', Cour Penale Internationale (In-
ternational Criminal Court), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uic-
ceng.pdf (last visited March 8, 2017).
42. 'Preliminary examination - Colombia', INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (on-
line), https://www.icc-cpi.int/colombia (last visited March 8, 2017).
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of 2004.43 The ICC has jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes committed
on the territory of Colombia or by its nationals from 2002 onwards and
war crimes committed since November of 2009.44 The Office of the Pros-
ecutor (OTP) for the ICC has noted the creation of the SJP, and has
stated that, once established, the SJP "would have jurisdiction to investi-
gate and prosecute those most responsible for the most serious conflict-
related crimes, including cases against members of the [FARC], members
of the armed forces and those who, directly or indirectly participated in
the internal armed conflict." 4 5
The UN has also established international criminal courts to prosecute
perpetrators of serious crimes against humanity and to bring justice to
victims of international crimes. Most notably, the Security Council estab-
lished ad hoc tribunals in the territory of the former Yugoslavia46 and in
Rwanda. 47 Both tribunals are mandated to bring to justice those respon-
sible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
in their respective regions, thus contributing to the restoration and main-
tenance of peace in both areas. 4 8 Though these tribunals have concurrent
jurisdiction with national courts over serious violations of international
humanitarian law, they can take over national investigations and pro-
ceedings at any stage if it proves to be in the "interest of international
justice." 4 9 It is important to note, however, that while the UN continues
to be involved in transitional justice issues around the world, the ICC
largely fulfills the role of those ad hoc criminal tribunals.5 0 Yet since its
inception fifteen years ago, the ICC has faced criticism as being yet an-
other costly international institution that is too inefficient to justify. With
a budget of 139.5 million Euros and a staff of over eight hundred, it is not
difficult to see why, especially considering that in all of its history the ICC
has only seen twenty-three cases and issued only six verdicts.s Likewise,
the special tribunals established by the UN have run budgets toppling $1
billion in ten plus years of operation. 5 2 These alternatives to national
transitional justice courts are costly, and perhaps not as efficient as in-
43. Supra note 35.
44. 'Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016', INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT - OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PEENG.pdf (at para. 233).
45. Id. at para. 253.
46. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), available at: http://www.un
.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=s/res/827(1993)
47. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), available at: http://www.un.org/
en/ga/search/view -doc.asp?symbol=s/res/955(1994).
48. 'Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction', ICTY.ORG, available at: http://
www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/mandate-and-crimes-under-icty-jurisdiction (last
visited March 15, 2017).
49. Id.
50. 'UN Documentation: International Law', UN.ORG, available at: http://research.un
.org/en/docs/law/courts (last visited March 15, 2017).
51. 'Facts and Figures', International Criminal Court, ICC-CPI.INT, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about (last visited March 15, 2017).
52. Rupert Skilbeck, 'Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials', DIGITAL COM-
MONS (2008), available at: https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/15/3skilbeck.pdf
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tended when they were first created. But, while costs of operating inter-
national courts may run high, they could provide some financial breathing
room for Colombia, since funding for both the ICC or ad hoc tribunals
such as the ICTY and ICTR are spread out among member states of the
UN and parties to the Rome Statute.5 3 Were Colombia to shift from the
domestic SJP measures to the ICC, it could present a major opportunity
to defray costs associated with investigating and prosecuting serious
crimes perpetrated during the conflict.
III. CONCLUSION
Following the end of Latin America's longest running armed conflict,
Colombians must now focus efforts on transitional justice. The form this
justice should take has been subject to much debate. The path Colombia
has chosen is in the form of national prosecutions that focus on truth and
public understanding, rather than custodial incarceration. 54 While this
may rub some Colombians (and international observers) the wrong way,
it is a strategic and efficient way to attempt to close the book on this
terrible conflict. But, serious economic questions remain as to whether
Colombia can shoulder the entire burden of prosecuting serious viola-
tions of humanitarian law. A snapshot of the current Colombian econ-
omy shows that GDP growth has slowed, commodity prices are down,
and expensive reconstruction plans and programs are likely to create a
tremendous burden on the Colombian government, as well as tax pay-
ers.55 In addition, seeking justice comes with associated costs: investigat-
ing and prosecuting thousands of cases will be time consuming and
expensive. However, there are benefits to this form of domestic transi-
tional justice, such as maintaining autonomy and control over Colombian
issues. Alternatives to the current form of transitional justice, such as
turning to the ICC or UN, may be worth considering. Hopefully, with
time Colombians can heal and move forward. The path may not be easy,
but in the end, finding peace after so long will certainly prove its worth.
53. Claire Calzonettie, 'Frequently Asked Questions about the International Criminal
Court', COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 23, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/
courts-and-tribunals/frequently-asked-questions-international-criminal-court/
p8981.
54. 'ABC: Special Jurisdiction for Peace', OrICINA DEL ALro CoMIsIoNADO PARA
LA PAZ, available at: https://law.yale.edu/system/files/abc-special-jurisdiction-for-
peace.pdf (last visited March 15, 2017).
55. 'How high is the cost of peace for Colombia?', THE CITY PAPER BOGOTA (Aug.
12, 2016), https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/how-high-the-cost-of-peace-for-co-
lombia/13968.
